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IT’S BEEN MOSTLY ABOUT MONEY! 
 
A MULTI-METHOD RESEARCH APPROACH 
TO THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
IN POST-COMMUNIST PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
 
Although much has been written about the process of party system 
institutionalization (PSI) in different regions: e.g. Latin America (Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995), Africa (Lindberg, 2007), East Asia (Stockton, 2001), Southern Europe 
(Morlino, 1998) or Eastern Europe (Bielasiak, 2002), and its extreme significance for 
the consolidation and healthy quality of democracy (Mainwaring, 1999; Morlino, 
1998); the reasons why some party systems institutionalize while others do not still 
remain a mystery. 
 Studies trying to discover the sources of such systemic institutionalization 
tend to adopt either a quantitative (e.g. Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005) or a 
qualitative character (e.g. Johnson, 2002; Meleshevich, 2007) and, consequently, face 
the following dilemma: either they identify a certain number of conditions affecting 
PSI in general (condition-centered designs), without specifying if they all apply to the 
different countries included in the analysis in the same manner, or they exclude from 
scratch certain conditions and focus on the causal chain connecting certain “pre-
conceived” factors with the outcome in a limited number of cases (mechanism-
centered designs).1 
 Seeking to resolve the above-cited quandary, and combining both types of 
research design (i.e. condition-/mechanism-centered), this article constitutes a first 
attempt to answer simultaneously all the following questions: (1) what specific factors 
help party systems to institutionalize (or not)?; (2) what are the links (in terms of time 
and degree) as well as the causal mechanisms behind such relationships?; and (3) how 
do they affect a particular party system? 
 In order to answer all these questions, and using a multi-method research 
(MMR) approach, the current article focuses on the study of party system 
development and institutionalization in 13 post-communist democracies since 1990. 
On the one hand, this will allow me to compare party systems within equivalent 
periods of time, avoiding inadequate comparisons with other established democracies 
                                                 
1 For an in-depth discussion of these two types of research design see Beach and Rohlfing (in this 
special issue). 
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which, as these are characterized by a higher degree of systemic stability, could lead 
to misleading conclusions (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 2012:112). On the other, I will be 
able to control not only for some external factors that may have influenced all 
countries in the region at one time (e.g. the Cold War, globalization, the world 
financial and economic crisis, etc.) but also for other conditions (see section 2) 
particularly specific to post-1989 Eastern European countries (Casal Bértoa, 
2013:399). In this context, post-communism functions as the scope condition under 
which the causal mechanism and set-theoretic relationships described in this article 
are considered to hold (Ragin, 2008:73). 
 Methodologically, the article innovates in five respects. First of all, it 
continues the debate on the importance of MMR when trying to answer different 
research questions (Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Cooper and Glaesser, 2012; Beach and 
Rohlfing, in this special issue). Secondly, it complements the literature on how 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and process tracing (PT) could be linked 
(Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013; also in this special issue). Thirdly, it constitutes the 
first attempt to date to use - following Rihoux and Ragin´s (2009) mandate - a Most 
Similar Different Outcome/Most Different Same Outcome (MSDO/MDSO) 
procedure in order to reduce causal complexity before undertaking a crisp-set QCA 
(csQCA). Fourthly, it also shows the merits of combining both congruence and PT in 
the same comparative study. Finally, it also develops a novel “bipolar comparative 
method” (BCM) to explain the extent to which opposite outcomes are determined by 
reverse conditions and conflicting intervening causal forces. 
 With such an ambitious enterprise in mind the current work, adopting a 
“comprehensive” approach, reviews the literature on the determinants of systemic 
institutionalization in section 2. Before that, the paper starts with an analytical 
perspective on the concept and measurement of PSI, establishing to what degree party 
systems in post-communist Europe have institutionalized (section 1). Trying to reduce 
“causal complexity”, the number of possible “key” factors is condensed to the 
minimum in section 3 with the use of MSDO/MDSO. Using both congruence and PT, 
section 4 looks at the “causal mechanisms” linking each of the relevant “explanatory” 
factors with party system (under-) institutionalization in two “typical” case studies. 
Aware of the problem of “complex causation” (Ragin, 1987), section 4 employs 
csQCA in order to identify how the different conditions combine to produce (or not) 
the outcome. 
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PSI: Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Summarizing a discussion sketched out elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 2015), there 
is little agreement in the literature on how PSI should be defined. This is so because, 
with very few exceptions (e.g. Meleshevich, 2007), most authors pay little attention to 
the notion itself and simply assume its multi-dimensional character. Still, and despite 
the on-going discussion on what are its main elements, most conceptualizations of the 
notion clearly refer to one dimension: namely, stability in the nature of inter-party 
competition (Lindberg, 2007). For this reason, 
and bearing in mind that the core of a party system is to be found in the 
patterns of interaction among its subunits (i.e. political parties) […], I 
consider PSI to be the process by which the patterns of interaction among 
political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time […] 
(Casal Bértoa, 2012:453). 
In order to assess the level of institutionalization in new post-communist party 
systems, and putting special emphasis on the stability of structure of inter-party 
competition for government, I will employ here Casal Bértoa and Mair´s framework. 
In their own words, 
the structure of competition is [inchoate], and hence the system is only 
weakly institutionalized, when there are (1) mainly partial alternations of 
governments; (2) the governing alternatives lack a stable composition; and 
(3) access to government is possible for almost all relevant parties. 
Conversely, the structure of competition is [stable] and the party systems 
institutionalized if (1) there is largely total alternation or an absence of 
alternation; (2) the governing alternatives are stable and familiar; and (3) 
government is monopolised by a limited number of the competing parties 
(2012:88-89). 
Following Casal Bértoa and Enyedi’s (2014) sophisticated new 
operationalization of the abovementioned framework, which combines the percentage 
of “ministerial volatility” (alternation) with the percentage of ministers belonging to 
familiar combinations of parties (familiarity) as well as to “old” governing parties 
(access), I will be able to rank post-communist party systems according to their level 
of stability in the structure of competition or institutionalization.2 
                                                 
2 An in depth discussion on the reliability, validity and robustness of the index can be found in Casal 
Bértoa and Enyedi (2014: 7-11). See also the (online) Appendix. 
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Figure 1. PSI in Post-communist Europe (1990-2010) 
 
Note: The year of the “founding” elections is in brackets 
 
An overview of the level of PSI between 1990 and 2010 in 13 Eastern 
European democracies3 is displayed in the figure above. The most evident conclusion 
derived from these summary data is that party systems in post-communist Europe 
have institutionalized at different rates and in different ways (Casal Bértoa and Mair, 
2012). It is to explaining why this has been so that I will devote the rest of the paper. 
 
Sources of PSI: a “Comprehensive” Approach 
When looking at the current literature on the topic it is possible to identify up 
to seventeen different factors which, either alone or in combination, have been 
considered essential when trying to explain PSI (Casal Bértoa, 2012). However, the 
quasi-natural experiment produced by the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc in 1989 
followed by the birth of newly independent and centralized states in the Baltics, the 
Balkans as well as in former Czechoslovakia, allows me already at this early stage to 
exclude from the analysis two of them: namely, nature of state and time of transition.4 
Moreover, and in a similar vein, years of authoritarianism can also be left out as it 
                                                 
3 All of the countries included in the current study are considered to be democratic (i.e. have a score of 
2 or lower), according to the Freedom House political and civil liberties index in the period here 
examined. With just one year of democratic experience in 2010, Montenegro has been excluded from 
the analysis. 
4 Democratized during the so-called “Third Wave”, none of the post-communist states here analyzed 
adopted a federal structure. 
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clearly overlaps with PDEM - especially when dichotomized.5 From a methodological 
perspective, it seems obvious that the variance in the outcome cannot be explained by 
constant conditions (Przeworksi and Teune, 1970). For all these reasons, the 
following paragraphs will focus only on the remaining fourteen conditions, presenting 
each of them in turn. 
Party institutionalization (PI). Few institutional developments have been considered 
to be more critical for systemic institutionalization than the formation and 
development of institutionalized political parties (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Toole, 
2000). 
Electoral disproportionality (EDISP) and party system concentration (PCON). While 
Sartori (1976) was the first scholar to link a party system´s “format” to its 
“mechanics”, it was not until 1990 that Bartolini and Mair established a direct 
relationship between systemic stability and the type of electoral system employed. 
Since then, however, various scholars have confirmed the importance both factors 
have for the institutionalization of party systems in new democracies (Mainwaring 
and Zoco, 2007; Tavits, 2005). 
Ideological polarization (POLAR). Building on Sartori (1976), scholars have again 
and again maintained that ideological polarization fosters PSI, as the greater the 
ideological distance between the different parties in the system, the less likely that 
voters/elites will shift their allegiances (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Madrid, 2005). 
Type of Regime (PARL). While in parliamentary regimes presidents tend to be elected 
either by compromise or by a qualified majority, presidential candidates in semi-
presidential regimes are usually obliged to forge broad coalitions cutting across 
ideological lines in order to attract as many segments of the population as possible. 
The main implication is that, as a reward for their support in presidential elections, 
parties “can plausibly claim to represent the decisive electoral bloc in a close contest 
and may make demands accordingly” (Linz, 1990:58). This will definitely have 
important implications for the stability of the structure of partisan competition at the 
time of government formation (Casal Bértoa, 2012, 2015). 
Party Funding (PFUND). Although Huntington (1968) was the first scholar to point 
out that political parties can develop rules in order to protect the integrity of the 
                                                 
5
 It seems rather obvious that newly democratized countries (e.g. Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, etc.) 
display longer authoritarian spans that those which experienced democracy at some point in the past 
(e.g. Estonia, Czech Republic or Slovakia). 
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political process from outsiders challenging the status quo ante, it was only with Katz 
and Mair´s (1995) “cartelization thesis” that scholars started to examine the positive 
link between public subsidies and PSI (Birnir, 2005; Spirova, 2007). 
Ethno-religious Concentration (ERCON). According to Lipset and Rokkan´s (1967) 
classical “hypothesis”, party systems freeze because “individuals develop attachments 
to parties on the basis of their social locations – their religion, class, residence (urban 
or rural) and culture (core versus minority culture)” (Mainwaring and Zoco, 
2007:163; Madrid, 2005). 
Cleavage Cumulation (CCUM). More recently, Casal Bértoa (2014) suggested that 
PSI takes place in those countries with a cumulative-coinciding cleavage structure, as 
parties/voters will be structured by those coinciding lines of division into two clearly 
defined alternative camps. On the contrary, in systems where cleavages have a cross-
cutting character institutionalization suffers, as parties can only cooperate across 
dividing ideological lines, making any possible alliance ad hoc, ephemeral and 
unpredictable. 
Political Culture (PCUL). Ever since Mainwaring an “anti-organizational” political 
culture has been considered to be an obstacle, although not necessarily a permanent 
one, to PSI (1999:233-234; Johnson, 2002:720-728). 
Historical legacies (LEGAC). According to Kitschelt (1995), 
[c]ritical junctures surrounding state building and timing of the entry of 
the masses into politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
determined the pattern of interwar politics, which shaped the structure of 
Communist authority, which in turn [coupled with a distinct mode of 
transition] determined the pattern of party structuration in the 
postcommunist period (Kopstein, 2003:239). 
In a few words, the main argument holds that the earlier the economic 
industrialization, state formation and democratization before communism, as well as 
the milder the type of communist rule, the more institutionalized the structure of inter-
party competition will be. 
Economic development (WEALTH). The level of economic development has long 
been seen to shape the process of PSI in new democracies, whether in Latin America 
(Madrid, 2005; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999), Eastern Europe (Tavits, 2005) or East 
Asia (Johnson, 2002), as under conditions of economic hardship voters will move 
away from incumbents trying to find new political alternatives, either in the 
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traditional opposition or at the fringes of the political spectrum (Mainwaring and 
Zoco, 2007; Tucker, 2006). 
Previous democracy (PDEM). Scholars have traditionally maintained that a higher 
level of PSI will take place in those countries with previous democratic experiences 
than in those nations where party competition is a new phenomenon (Kitschelt, 1995; 
Remmer, 1985). 
Democratic experience (YoD). According to most scholars PSI is a lengthy process in 
which stable patterns of partisan competition will only emerge after democratic 
government has been in place for some time (Spirova, 2007: 161-162; Tavits, 2005: 
296). 
EU conditionality (EUCON). According to Vachudová (2008), EU integration 
fostered PSI by shifting the main dimension of partisan competition from culture to 
economy.  For others, however, “EU has been a contributing factor in the inability of 
CEE party systems […] to acquire the attributes of an institutionalized party system” 
(Ladrech, 2011: 219). 
 
Relevant Factors (What?): MSDO/MDSO 
As we have already seen, comparative political theory offers different possible 
(co-)explanations for the distinct levels of PSI observed in new and old democracies. 
In this article, where the number of possible combinations of conditions (214=16,384) 
clearly dwarfs the number of cases available for analysis (13), I will make use of De 
Meur and Berg-Schlosser´s (1994) MSDO/MDSO procedure, a technique particularly 
well suited as a prior step before using csQCA and, on the whole, extremely useful for 
systemic analyses which, like this one, present the so-called “limited diversity” 
problem.6 It is in the name of parsimony and in order to avoid a simple description of 
cases - with one individual explanation per case - that a solution to this problem needs 
to be found before proceeding with any QCA-type analysis (Berg-Schlosser and De 
Meur, 2009:27). 
The idea is, thereby, that by carefully matching all the cases (i.e. party 
systems) under study across the different (potential) explanatory factors7 found in the 
institutionalization literature, using a step-wise elaboration of distance matrices and 
                                                 
6 Limited diversity occurs when no real cases matching all logically possible combinations of the 
selected conditions can be found (Grofman and Schneider, 2009:3). 
7 Throughout the text both terms “explanatory factors” and “ conditions” are used synonymously. 
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dis-/similarity graphs (see online Appendix),8 I can identify the most similar pairs of 
cases with a different outcome as well as the most different pairs of cases displaying a 
similar outcome (Rihoux, 2006:688). This will allow me to reduce the number of 
conditions to the minimum and, therefore, to be able to achieve a less complex 
comparison which, without any preconceived ideas, focuses on those relevant factors 
that might account for the different degrees of systemic institutionalization observed 
(De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009:215). 
Bearing in mind that we have fourteen possible explanatory factors, and 
following the logic of the MDSO/MSDO procedure (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 
1994; De Meur and Gottcheiner, 2009; De Meur et al., 2006), I have first clustered 
the different conditions into three rather homogeneous categories: namely, socio-
economic (A), historic-structural (B), and systemic-institutional (C).9 Secondly, and 
because the criteria used to calculate the distance between (two) factors are based on 
Boolean algebra, all conditions need to be dichotomized (De Meur et al., 2006:69). 
This is done according to the criteria established in Table A1,10 which displays not 
only the threshold for the dichotomization of both the conditions and the outcome, but 
also the sources according to which such thresholds are established. The result is a 
data matrix (Table A2) featuring thirteen cases (seven positive/institutionalized and 
six negative/non-institutionalized), and fourteen Boolean conditions where 1 indicates 
presence, and 0 stands for absence. 
Once these operations have taken place, and before proceeding with any 
further comparison, it is essential to identify which pairs of cases are the most similar 
and which the most dissimilar. For that it is necessary to build and synthesise distance 
matrices within and across categories (De Meur et al., 2006:75), as cases can be 
similar in one category (e.g. socio-economic) but dissimilar for another (e.g. 
systemic-institutional).11 In order to do so, I make use of the software (beta version 
8/7/2006) developed by De Meur, 12  which helps to select which cases share the 
smallest number of same-valued conditions and identical outcomes (MDSO pairs) and 
                                                 
8 Available at http://whogoverns.eu/biography/publications/. 
9 See also Casal Bértoa (2012: 455, 472). 
10 Tables A1 to A14 as well as Figures A1 to A3 are all included in the Appendix. 
11 Berg Schlosser and De Meur´s (1994:199-200) method employs the so-called “Boolean distance”, 
which simply refers to the number of variables for which two cases differ from each other (per 
category).  
12 Available at http://www.jchr.be/01/beta.htm. 
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the smallest number of different-valued conditions and different outcomes (MSDO 
pairs). 
Table A3 summarizes the levels of dis-/similarity for each pair of cases at 
different levels of requirement (more or less demanding) within each outcome:13 
namely, most different with a positive outcome (MDSO+ in zone 1, in blue); most 
different with a negative outcome (MDSO- in zone 2, in purple); and MSDO (zone 3, 
in yellow). The higher the added value (integer), the more dissimilar (blue and purple 
zones) and/or similar (yellow zone) the cases are and, therefore, the more valuable the 
comparison.14 
The pairs of cases selected by this process are then aggregated in three dis-
/similarity graphs (figures A1 to A3), with different levels of dis-/similarity illustrated 
by continuous (higher) and dotted (lower) lines. On the basis of these three 
graphs/figures, I then proceed to compare15 the most dissimilar but institutionalized 
party systems: namely, Romania and the Czech Republic (integer = 22222). Out of 
the initial fourteen conditions, only PCON and PFUND are present in both cases and, 
therefore, can be considered to explain the (presence of the) outcome. Adding to the 
comparison the countries with the second and third highest integer (Slovenia and 
Hungary, respectively) reduces the number of similar – hence relevant - factors to just 
one (PFUND), although PCON is still present in three out of the four cases.16 At a 
lower level of dissimilarity (integer = 12222), the comparison of Ukraine with 
Hungary yields two (similar/relevant) conditions: CCUM and again PCON, although 
the latter becomes irrelevant once Slovenia is added to the comparison. A third 
comparison (Slovakia vs. Croatia) highlights WEALTH, POLAR and, again, PFUND. 
A comparison between the two most dissimilar non-institutionalized party 
systems (i.e. Latvia and Bulgaria)17 yields three (similar/relevant) conditions absent in 
both cases: namely, WEALTH, PI and PFUND. However, the inclusion of Serbia (a 
                                                 
13  Scores for Boolean distances per category, as well as for the different levels of requirement, are 
available from the author upon request. 
14 Thus, for example, in zone 2 (purple) the comparison between Bulgaria and Latvia (integer = 23333) 
is much more interesting than between the latter and Serbia (integer = 22222) as the first pair of party 
systems share more common conditions that help to explain their similar outcome (see table A7, also 
figure A2). 
15 The complete set of pairwise or three by three comparisons can be seen in tables A4 to A11 in the 
Appendix. It should also be noted here that factors contradicting the initial hypotheses are considered 
to be irrelevant: i.e. ERCON (twice), YoD (twice), LEGAC (once), PDEM (once), or EDISP (once).  
16 Just as POLAR. 
17 See footnote 14. 
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less dissimilar country) in the comparison allows for the exclusion of the last two 
(present in the Serbian case). 
 Serbia and Romania are the MSDO cases (integer = 13333). Indeed, they are 
similar in every condition but two: ERCON and PCON. When other less similar cases 
(Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia) are added to the comparison, only PCON seems to 
keep its relevancy. Interestingly enough, however, the comparison between Serbia 
and these three countries yields CCUM as an important explanatory factor. 
Considering the pair Czech Republic and Latvia puts the emphasis on WEALTH, 
PCON and PFUND. The inclusion of Estonia in the comparison only confirms the 
previous results, although PFUND disappears once Poland is added to the 
comparison. Still, these four by four comparisons seem to yield four relevant 
conditions: namely, PCON, WEALTH and, to a lesser extent, PFUND as well as 
CCUM (present in three of the four cases). The latter three are also deemed relevant 
in a three by three comparison between Lithuania, Slovenia and Hungary. In this case, 
the importance of PI and POLAR should not be forgotten. Finally, considering the 
pair Romania vs. Bulgaria adds PI and PFUND to the analysis. 
 Once the MSDO/MDSO procedure is completed, it seems clear that the 
number of relevant factors can be reduced to just four: namely, parliamentary 
concentration, cleavage cumulation, economic wealth and party funding. Indeed, 
while the last two pop up in all three analyses (i.e. MDSO+, MDSO- and MSDO), the 
first two reach a high level of significance in both MDSO+ and MSDO analyses. All 
in all, these four conditions appear up to five times (WEALTH) or more (PCON, 
CCUM and PFUND), in contrast to other less relevant (just twice), and sometimes 
contradictory (see pair Serbia vs. Ukraine in table A8) factors: namely, PI and 
POLAR.18 
All in all, it is only after reducing the number of possible explanatory factors 
by more than three quarters that a methodologically manageable, and certainly less 
complex, analysis of the “causal link/s” between those four conditions and the 
outcome (and/or the lack of it) can be undertaken. 
 
Causal Mechanisms (Why?): Congruence and PT 
                                                 
18 The inclusion of pairs displaying lower integer scores and, therefore, reduced dis-/similarity levels 
(see De Meur and Berg-Schlosser, 1994:203, 204-205) only confirms these results. WEALTH, 
PFUND, CCUM and PCON (in that order) are to be considered by far the most “relevant” explanatory 
factors. These data are available from the author upon request. 
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In order to know how the previously mentioned relevant factors affect the 
process of PSI, I will make use in this section of two well-known case-study methods. 
The first one, the so-called “congruence method”, will help me to understand to what 
extent variance in the level of PSI can be explained by variance in each of the above-
cited conditions. This will be done by testing both the direction and degree of change 
in both the outcome and the various conditions at different points in time during the 
process of PSI (George and Bennett, 2005:181-204, 486). In particular, the above-
cited method is particularly suitable for analysing phenomena which - like PSI itself - 
refer to processes which not only involve specific periodizations (e.g. elections, 
governmental changes, etc.), but are neither monotonic, unidirectional or finite. It is in 
such cases that the congruence method reveals itself to be particularly useful, 
allowing not only for the analysis of PSI at the end of the process, but also at any 
particular point in time during it. 
The second (PT) will allow me not only to see if there really is a common 
causal mechanism 19  linking the conditions and outcome, but also to specifically 
identify the “causal chain” leading from the presence (or the absence) of wealth 
and/or parliamentary concentration and/or cleavage cumulation and/or party funding 
to party system (non-) institutionalization (Beach and Pedersen, 2013:5). The idea is 
that, by breaking down the rather large process of systemic institutionalization into its 
constituent parts, I can more easily trace the process by which each of the above-
mentioned conditions have produced the (expected) outcome (Caporaso, 2009). 
 Independently of the within-case method employed, the first step in any 
congruence/PT-first research design is always the selection of typical cases (see 
Beach and Rohlfing or Schneider and Rohlfing, in this special issue). Because I am 
equally interested in understanding both PSI and its absence, I will proceed with what 
I have called a BCM.20 By combining the advantages of both comparative and within-
case methods,21 the BCM allows researchers not only to explain opposite outcomes, 
but also to capture the “causal mechanism” behind processes which, even if facing 
each other, do not necessarily mirror each other. In particular, the idea is that by 
choosing two cases which, sharing most of the conditions, totally diverge in both the 
                                                 
19 For a discussion on the definition, features and foundation of a casual mechanism see Schneider and 
Rohlfing (in this special issue). 
20 I am especially thankful to Derek Beach for this particular suggestion. 
21 Especially, if we take into consideration that “conclusions are the more solid, the more cases we 
examine and the more evidence points in [a certain] direction” (Beach and Rolhfing, in this special 
issue). 
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“relevant” conditions and the outcomes, I will be able to “direct [my] attention to the 
ways in which they differ (Gerring, 2007:133-135)” (Tarrow, 2010:234), examining 
in particular how such opposite “causal forces” actually work. 
Going back to the cases and looking again at the MSDO/MDSO results (table 
A11) it follows that two of the most similar party systems with totally opposite levels 
of institutionalization are Hungary (positive) and Lithuania (negative).22 
The fact that economic development is one of the most important determinants 
of PSI in post-communist Europe does not come as a surprise. Indeed, when we look 
at the state of the economy as well as the degree of systemic institutionalization in 
both Hungary (figure 2) and Lithuania (figure 3) at the end of each electoral period 
we can observe a rather clear (positive and negative, respectively) relationship. Thus, 
while the state of the economy in Lithuania – on every single indicator – has never 
been as good as in Hungary, the degree of PSI in the latter has always been superior. 
In this context, it should be borne in mind that while Hungary had already started a 
process of (limited) economic liberalization in the second half of the 1960s, 23 
Lithuania remained within the Soviet “administratively centralized planned economy” 
until the early 1990s. This gave Hungary, itself one of the most economically 
developed countries within the Soviet bloc, a clear advantage over Lithuania, where 
bad economic performance has remained one of the main triggers of cabinet turnover 
and party system instability. 
Figures 2 and 3. Economic development, legislative fragmentation and PSI in 
Hungary and Lithuania 
                                                 
22 For the importance of analysing negative cases, even if not deviant, see Mikkelsen (in this special 
issue). 
23 The so-called “New Economic Mechanism”, which liberalized foreign trade and enabled the limited 
introduction of small businesses in a still state-controlled market, was introduced by János Kádár in 
1966. 
 13 
 
 
But the above-mentioned differences are also visible within countries. Indeed, 
as follows from the figure on the left, systemic institutionalization only started to 
increase in Hungary once the state of the economy began clearly to improve in the 
second half of the 1990s. In particular, while the mixed signals of the early 1990s (i.e. 
GDP growth whilst high unemployment and inflation continued) did not help the 
structure of inter-party competition to stabilize, a clear improvement in all these 
indicators from the time of the second free and fair elections onwards seems certainly 
to have fostered the process of systemic institutionalization. That is at least until the 
second half of the 2000s when the latter stagnated immediately after the first signs of 
the global economic and financial crisis began to produce their effects (i.e. growth 
decline, inflation and unemployment) in the country. 
On the other hand, and with the exception of the first few years when the 
Soviet legacy had left the economy in such bad shape that the only alternative was 
improvement, each post-electoral government alternation in Lithuania has been 
preceded by a period of economic uncertainty. In fact, and notwithstanding the sound 
creation of employment until 2008, the overall economic tendency since 1998 has 
been that of general decline, with periods of growth and moderate inflation followed 
by important drops in the GDP (in 1999, 2004 and, especially, after 2007) and 
inflation (steadily after 1999). In parallel, and as expected, the Lithuanian party 
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system has suffered a chronic process of de-institutionalization since the late 1990s 
(Ramonaitė, 2006). 
As follows from the MSDO/MDSO analysis above, parliamentary 
fragmentation also needs to be considered as one of PSI´s most important 
determinants. The logic is that, as thoroughly explained elsewhere (Casal Bértoa, 
2012, 2015), by indicating the numbers (and strength) of “streams of interaction”, the 
number (and size) of parties winning seats in legislative elections clearly determines 
the likely tactics of partisan competition and opposition as well as government 
formation possibilities in a country. Moreover, because the number of parties has 
“mechanical predispositions” in the sense that it gives us information on certain 
functional properties (e.g. interaction streams, coalition potential, etc.), the 
relationship between party system format and institutionalization can be said to be 
“path-dependence” as it responds to the following pattern: “the greater the number of 
parties (that have a say), the greater the complexity and probably the intricacy of the 
[interactions will be]” (Sartori, 1976:120, 173). In other words, when party leaders 
must follow manoeuvres among a large number of parties, predictability and stability 
in the structure of inter-party competition is obviously hindered. 
 Figures 2 and 3 above, which display the scores of both parliamentary 
fragmentation and PSI at the end of each electoral period in Hungary and Lithuania 
(respectively), show the almost perfect relationship between the above-cited two 
conditions. Hence, while in the institutionalized Hungarian party system the 
“effective” number of legislative parties - constantly below four – has decreased over 
time (from 3.8 to 2.4), the Lithuanian party system has suffered from a continuous 
and parallel process of fragmentation (from 3 to 5.8) and de-institutionalization. 
Moreover, and apart from this pronounced inter-country variation, another striking 
pattern revealed by these data is one that is also intuitively plausible: within each 
country parliamentary fragmentation and PSI rise and fall in accord, so when the 
former decreases the latter increases and vice versa. In other words, and confirming 
previous expectations, they fluctuate not only in the same direction but also to a 
similar extent. 
Similarly, party funding has also contributed to the institutionalization of post-
communist party systems as it has eased the continuity of existing political options 
while, at the same time, reducing “the impact of those seeking to challenge the 
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political status quo” (Scarrow, 2006:629). In other words, by discouraging the entry 
of new parties to the system and, therefore, keeping the number of (both electoral and 
parliamentary) parties rather low, publicly funded party systems have been able to 
guarantee the supremacy of already existing parties (Katz and Mair, 1995:15) and, 
consequently, assure the stability and predictability of the structure of competition 
among them. 
Table 1. Consequences of party funding for PSI in Hungary and Lithuania 
Country Period (n. 
of elections) 
Total number of 
electoral parties 
Small Party 
Vote Share 
Party Survival 
Rate* 
Hungary 1990-2010 (6) 9.2 9.7 94 (40) 
 
Lithuania 
1992-2010 (5) 14.8 20.4 n/a (52.4) 
1992-1999 (2) 16.5 24.4 n/a (73.5) 
2000-2010 (3) 13.7 17.7 95 (31.3) 
* The figure in brackets refers to parties deprived of State financial support. 
Source: Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2013:33, 35) 
 
 In order to test the above-mentioned statements, table 2 compares the two 
party systems at hand on the basis of the number of parties winning at least 0.5 per 
cent of the vote as well as the share of parties winning less than 5 per cent of the vote 
(Scarrow, 2006). No matter at which indicator we look, it seems clear that “the model 
of Hungarian party funding [has…] help[ed…] to consolidate the party system” 
(Enyedi, 2007: 102). The argument that this is the case derives also from the fact that, 
as displayed above, both indicators clearly improved after the introduction of public 
subsidies for Lithuanian political parties in 1999, although not to the same levels as its 
Hungarian counterpart (see also figure 3). 
In a similar vein, while the Hungarian model of public funding introduced 
from the very beginning a clear discrimination between publicly and non-publicly 
funded parties, guaranteeing the concentration of the party system among a reduced 
number of political options; in Lithuania such a “reductive” effect only started to take 
place after 1999, when a 3 per cent “payout threshold” was introduced. In fact, and as 
follows from the last column in table 1, while publicly funded parties in Hungary 
have managed to survive election after election, in Lithuania up to 1999 the average 
survival rate of political parties barely reached 73 per cent. However, and as expected, 
this percentage started to increase from that year onwards for publicly funded parties, 
while it decreased for all those unable to pass the “payout threshold”. As a result, a 
process of party system concentration was initiated among those parties deprived of 
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public funds with the only aim of survival: for example, LCS merged with LLS before 
the 2004 elections in order to form LCiS; similarly, LPKTS merged into TS. Equally, 
in 2008 both LTS and LKD, unable to cross the payout threshold in 2004, merged 
with TS (Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2013:19-20, 37). 
But together with a country´s economy and institutions, sociological factors 
have also played an important role in the process of PSI. 
The idea is that when cleavages are cross-cutting, parties will have 
difficulties in finding ideologically contiguous partners with which to 
cooperate, as being close in one dimension may be accompanied by 
irreconcilable differences in another. On the contrary, when cleavages are 
cumulative (i.e. coinciding), parties will tend to interact only with other 
parties within the same side of the cleavage, rejecting any cooperation that 
would lead them to cross such a line (Casal Bértoa, 2014). 
This will definitely simplify the structure of inter-party competition into two different 
and separate blocs, making it more stable and predictable over time. 
Thus, and as follows from the figure below, the cumulative character of 
cleavages in Hungary has enabled a division of the political spectrum into two very 
antagonistic (and stable) political camps: “a socially conservative, religious, 
somewhat nationalist, and anti-communist camp [...] and [...] a secular, morally 
permissive and generally less nationalist camp” (Tóka, 2004:322; see also Enyedi, 
2006). The result has been a very well institutionalized party system in which the 
structure of inter-party competition has pitted again and again the political forces of 
the cosmopolitan, post-communist and anti-clerical “left” (mainly MSZP and SZDSZ) 
against the nationalist, anti-communist and clerical “right” (basically Fidesz/KDNP, 
MDF and FKgP). 
In clear contrast, the Lithuanian party system has been characterized since the 
very beginning by a cross-cutting multi-dimensional space of inter-party competition 
revolving around two different types of cleavage: economic and urban/rural (Duvold 
and Jurkynas, 2004), which have divided the political spectrum into four different 
politico-ideological fields (figure 4): 
a) Socialist (strong support of state interventionism and a cosmopolitanism), 
b) Agrarian (support for state interventionism combined with traditionalism), 
c) Conservative (combination of pro-market attitudes and traditionalism, usually in a 
Christian-democratic version), 
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d) Liberal (strong support of free-market/enterprise and modern values).  
Figure 4. Political parties and cleavages structuration in Hungary* and Lithuania 
Secular/Rural 
 
                                   
                  SZDSZ     
VNDPS 
              LKDS 
        MSZP              
                 LKD   
             
                   LDP  
  Post-commun.                  Anti-commun. 
                                                        
               Statist       LSdP                      Liberal  
                                            
           TS 
                                          NS/SL 
                         
                          Fidesz 
                                                  FKgP 
                                    MIÉP  
                MDF      LiCS 
 
Religious/Urban 
  
* In italics. 
Source: Benoit & Laver (2006) 
Because the social protectionist camp (socialists + agrarians) differs from the 
pro-market camp (conservatives + liberals) in terms of the economy, while the urban 
camp (socialists + liberals) differs from the rural camp (agrarians + conservatives) in 
terms of cosmopolitanism, parties have found it very difficult to establish stable 
patterns of governmental and/or electoral cooperation. In fact, in almost twenty years 
of democratic politics only the first (mono-color) Lithuanian government managed to 
unite all parties from the same political field. 
Looking at the previous “congruent” analysis, it seems clear that there is an 
almost perfect - in time and degree - relationship between each of the above-
mentioned explanatory factors and PSI. Unfortunately, it does not tell us anything 
about the causal mechanism linking the former with the latter. For that a more in-
depth PT analysis “detailing each of the parts of the mechanism between X [here 
causal factors] and the outcome, focusing on how they transmit causal forces” is 
needed (Beach, in this special issue). 
 Interestingly enough, and implicit in previous literature (Bartolini and Mair, 
1990; Birnir, 2005; Casal Bértoa, 2012; Tucker, 2006), there seems to be a common 
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causal mechanism linking, positively or negatively, each of the above-mentioned 
factors with the process of systemic institutionalization. Figure 5 displays a tentative 
formalization of the mechanism, with the top illustrating the parts and the bottom the 
observable implications. 
 As can be observed above, the first part of the mechanism refers to the 
triggers: namely, the presence of economic development, party concentration, a 
cumulative cleavage structure and/or public subsidies to political parties. At this 
moment, we should expect to find evidences of high GDP growth and/or low 
inflation/unemployment rates, a moderately low number of parties in parliament, low 
levels of cleavage cross-cuttingness in society and a rather high level of political 
parties financially dependent on the State. 
 The second part shows that the electorate, in light of the above-mentioned 
favourable conditions, will remain stable in their partisan preferences. We should then 
expect to find relatively low levels of change in the balance of power among parties: 
that is, they should be able to attract a rather similar percentage of votes again and 
again. This would help them not only to strength the levels of partisanship (i.e. 
identification, closeness, membership) in society, but to routinize predictable patterns 
of (coalitional/cooperative) behaviour among them. 
For the third part of the mechanism, we should see that the partisan status quo 
remains almost unaltered election after election. The observable implications here 
may consist of few parties coming or going within the electoral spectrum. As a result, 
and at the end of the mechanism, we should detect a relevant degree of systemic 
turnover. In this context, we should expect to observe quite high levels of partisan 
continuity at the parliamentary level.24 
 Lastly, the outcome should be PSI. In practical terms, we should then observe 
at the time of government formation stable patterns of competition among all political 
parties in the system, in terms of alternation, formula and access. Note here however 
that if the contrary is true for every single part of the mechanism displayed above, 
then a similar but opposite process leading to weak levels of PSI would be observed.
                                                 
24 It should be noted that party continuity and PI are two different, although related, concepts (see 
footnote 3 in the Appendix). 
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Figure 5. A Socio-Economic-Institutional Explanation of PSI: Causal Mechanism 
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In order to observe how the causal mechanism unpacked above works in 
practice, we will make use again of the typical (positive and negative, respectively) 
cases of Hungary and Lithuania. This will allow me to avoid the analysis of part one, 
already explained in depth above: both synchronically and diachronically. Regarding 
part three, the most straightforward way of looking at the degree of change in the 
balance of electoral power among political parties is to look at the Pedersen´s index of 
electoral volatility for both countries in the period here examined. While on average 
Hungarian voters´ volatility barely passes 23 per cent, and is therefore one of the most 
“stable” within the post-communist region, the Lithuanian electorate - with barely 40 
per cent - is considered to be the most unstable in the whole European continent 
(Casal Bértoa, 2013:417). In fact, while until 2010 Hungarian voters´ preferences 
became steadily more stable (from 26.3 in 1994 to 8.4 in 2006) thanks to a rather 
stable economic situation (see figure 2), a clear reduction in the level of parliamentary 
fragmentation (from 3.8 in 1990 to 2.4 in 2006), a change from a tri-polar cleavage 
structure to a bipolar one in 1994 (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011:123, 127-128) and 
a rather liberal party funding regime (Casal Bértoa and Spirova, 2013:10); the level of 
volatility in Lithuania has remained rather high (always above 20 per cent, with a 
continuous increase until 2004) during the whole period (table A12), mainly due to 
the unstable (almost continuously declining) economic situation, an increasing level 
of fragmentation (from 3 in 1992 to 5.8 in 2008), a rather stable level of cleavage 
cross-cuttingness (see figure 4) and a rather restrictive party finance regime, only 
introduced in 1999. 
 Did such stable/unstable environments in Hungary/Lithuania close/open the 
electoral market to new political forces, while maintaining/altering the status quo of 
“traditional” parties? A strong test of this part is to look at the number of new parties 
(NNP) entering the electorate after the second electoral contest (table A12). In 
consonance with the steady decrease of electoral volatility, the NNP entering the 
Hungarian party system until 2010 suffered a significant decline over time (from 4 in 
1994 to none in 2006). In a similar vein, the fact that none of the new parties has 
managed to become “relevant” - in the Sartorian meaning of the term - clearly 
illustrates the resilience of Hungarian “traditional” parties. In clear contrast, the 
average NNP in Lithuania more than doubles the same figure for Hungary: 5 vs. 2, 
respectively. Moreover, while it decreased from 9 in 1996 to 4 in 2000 and again to 3 
in 2004, it increased again in 2008 when 4 new parties entered the electoral arena. 
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Two of these parties (i.e. LRLS and TPP) even became part of the governing 
coalition, something that had already happened both in 2000 and 2004 when the 
recently formed NS/SL and DP, respectively, entered the Paksas´ and Brazaukas´ 
cabinets as junior partners. On the other hand, various have been the “relevant” 
parties obliged to disappear due to their steady electoral decline: namely, LKD, LCS 
or LLS (see above). 
 Part four refers to the continuity (or not) of the main political options in the 
party system. The best way to test this fragment of the causal chain displayed above is 
to look at the number of parties entering and leaving the party system at each election. 
Using Toole´s “party system turnover” (PST) index (2000:450) to calculate the latter, 
it is possible to observe once again a clear contrast between the two countries here 
analysed. In fact, not only is the average PST in Hungary much lower than in 
Lithuania (0.4 vs. 0.6, respectively), but also it has been so in every single election 
but for one: 2006 (table A12).  Even more, while in Lithuania 
the symptoms of the deepening crisis of traditional parties were already 
apparent somewhat [at the time of] the 1997/1998 presidential election [or 
even earlier as] the parliamentary election of 1996 was marked by an 
increased proportion of wasted votes (Ramonaitė, 2006:84); 
the post-communist history of the [Hungarian] parliament can be retold 
[…] with no more than seven part[ies: namely, FKgP, KDNP, MDF, 
MIÉP, Fidesz, MSZP and SZDSZ] (Enyedi, 2006:177). 
Regarding the outcome, was there a stabilization/destabilization in the 
structure of competition for government? As illustrated in Casal Bértoa and Mair 
(2012: 95, 98, 103), and explained elsewhere (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011:123-
129), the patterns of inter-party collaboration/cooperation in Hungary have been 
rather stable, especially since 1994 when a tri-polar structure of partisan competition 
gave way to a bipolar one, pitting the parties on the left (MSZP and SZDSZ) against 
the parties on the right (Fidesz plus other minor conservative parties). On the 
contrary, “the Lithuanian party system appears to be in a state of flux”, especially 
after the parliamentary elections of 2000, a real “turning point in [its] development” 
(Ramonaitė, 2006:71, 84). Indeed, it was at this time when the two-bloc confrontation 
(i.e. socialist vs. conservatives) was disturbed by the emergence - first with the 
liberals, later with the populists - of a tripolar structure of competition. 
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All in all, the previous findings confirm that PSI is far from being a 
“unidirectional or irreversible” phenomenon (Stockton, 2001:95). In fact, and 
notwithstanding the specific status of a party system at a certain point in time, what 
clearly follows from the “congruence” analysis undertaken above is that variance in 
one or more of the conditions can modulate the degree of PSI over time. This is not to 
deny that, as follows from the PT analysis, there are also a number of specific forces – 
common to all conditions – which bounded together clearly affect the mode in which 
those conditions determine the degree and direction of PSI as a whole. 
 
Causal Combinations (How?): csQCA 
Now that we know the intervening causal process by which socio-economic 
and institutional conditions are linked to PSI (or its absence), and bearing in mind that 
not all of them are present (or absent) in all party systems, I will try to discover how 
such conditions have combined in each of the post-communist countries here 
analysed. For that csQCA - a methodological technique dealing with a limited number 
of cases in a “configurational” way - constitutes the perfect tool (Beach and Rohlfing 
in this special issue; Ragin, 1987). 
According to the “Standards of Good Practice in QCA” (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2010), the analysis of necessary and of sufficient conditions, with the 
former always going first, needs to be separate for the outcome and for its non-
occurrence. 
Conditions for PSI 
 In terms of necessity, the analysis (table A13) reveals that none of the four 
conditions, either in its presence or its logical negation, reaches the consistency 
threshold of 0.9 recommended in the literature (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012; 
Schneider and Rohlfing, 2013). However PFUND with a consistency threshold of 
0.86 comes close, anticipating the importance such a condition has for the explanation 
of PSI (see below). 
 In order to perform the analysis of sufficiency it is essential to elaborate a 
truth table based on the four conditions. As the “contradictions-free” truth table (table 
A14) shows, 13 cases fall into 9 truth table rows, the remaining 7 rows are logical 
remainders. After including only those cases when the outcome (PSI) is present (raw 
consistency = 1), the “standard analysis” (Ragin, 2008) is performed, limiting my 
interpretation to the so-called “intermediate solution” (Schneider and Wagemann, 
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2012). Because this solution uses for counterfactual claims all those logical 
remainders that comply with the directional expectations on the single conditions, the 
latter need to be set before proceeding further with the analysis. Thus, and on the 
basis of the theoretical consideration explained earlier in this article, a condition is 
expected to contribute to PSI when: WEALTH – PCON – CCUM – PFUND. 
 Taking all this setup into consideration, and after the information displayed in 
the truth table has been logically minimized, the csQCA analysis yields an 
intermediate solution term with three sufficient paths towards PSI (table 2). Their 
relatively low unique coverage values indicate that there are several cases displaying 
PSI for more than one reason: namely, Hungary, Croatia and the Czech Republic. 
There are, however, four uniquely covered cases: Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and 
Ukraine. The overall solution term shows perfect consistency and coverage, meaning 
that we are able to explain PSI in all cases. 
Table 2. Pathways to systemic institutionalization (PSI) 
Solutions Raw coverage Unique coverage Countries 
PFUN*WEALTH .71 .29 Hun, Cro, Cze+Slk, Slv 
PFUND*PCON .57 .14 Hun, Cro, Cze+Rom 
CCUM*PCON .57 .14 Hun, Cro, Cze+Ukr 
Solution consistency 1.0 
Solution coverage 1.0 
Source: Table compiled on the basis of the results obtained with fsQCA 2.5 
 
According to the formula displayed above, and bearing in mind that poor 
economic development is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for weak systemic 
institutionalization, it seems clear that party systems will always be institutionalized 
in rich countries. This is not to say that party systems in poor countries are 
condemned to be under-institutionalized. On the contrary, PSI will take place in poor 
countries provided that, together with a low number of parliamentary parties, they 
make available public funding for political parties or cleavages structure in a 
cumulative way. 
Conditions for psi 
Using the same conditions as before, but bearing in mind that causation is not 
essentially symmetric, I proceed now to analyze why some party systems have 
remained under-institutionalized during the period here examined. 
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 Interestingly enough, the analysis of necessity reveals that poor economic 
development (wealth), with a consistency score of 1, is a necessary condition for 
weak systemic institutionalization. This has important implications for the sufficiency 
analysis below as I will need to block any logical remainder displaying the presence 
of the condition (WEALTH). This finding does not come, however, as a surprise. In 
fact, taking into consideration the literature on the topic as well as bearing in mind the 
“causal mechanism” explained above, the economy is the only condition producing 
both a closer (i.e. on the demand side) and short-term effects on the electorate.25 
 As far as the analysis of sufficiency is concerned, and after imposing a 
frequency threshold of one and a raw consistency threshold of 0.8, I specify the 
following directional expectations: wealth-pcon-ccum-pfund. This yields an 
intermediate solution term consisting again of three paths containing the necessary 
condition wealth (table 3). 
Table 3. Pathways to systemic under-institutionalization (psi) 
Solutions Raw coverage Unique coverage Countries 
wealth*pcon*ccum .67 .33 Est, Lit+Pol, Ser 
wealth*pcon*pfund .5 .17 Est, Lit+Lat 
wealth*ccum*pfund .5 .17 Bul+Est, Lit 
Solution consistency 1.0 
Solution coverage 1.0 
Source: Table compiled on the basis of the results obtained with fsQCA 2.5 
 
 Similarly to the solution term for the outcome, the relatively low unique 
coverage values of all three paths signal that they empirically overlap. Thus, both the 
Estonian and Lithuanian party systems display weak levels of systemic 
institutionalization for different reasons. Although there are four uniquely covered 
cases (i.e. Poland, Serbia, Latvia and Bulgaria), both the consistency and coverage of 
the overall solution term is 1. 
Leaving aside the fact that party systems in rich countries will never suffer 
from weak levels of institutionalization, it seems clear that the combination of two of 
any of the other three conditions (i.e. pcon, ccum and pfund) will be enough to hinder 
the process of systemic institutionalization. 
                                                 
25 In fact, while the impact of both a country´s cleavage structure and the party funding regime on the 
process of systemic institutionalization tends to present a long-term character (Tavits, 2005; Birnir, 
2005), the number of parties affects the supply side of electoral volatility (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; 
Pedersen, 1979). 
 25 
All in all, it seems clear that money (WEALTH*PFUND) is the most 
important “causal model” explaining the process of PSI in post-communist Europe. 
This is not to say that PSI cannot take place in poor (wealth*pfund) countries (e.g. 
Ukraine), provided they have an adequate socio-institutional configuration 
(PCON*CCUM). However, if the latter is not true – i.e. only one of these two 
conditions is present  - then their fate is totally sealed. 
 
Conclusions 
Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995) trumpeted the important consequences 
PSI may have for the consolidation of democracy in post-transitional countries, much 
has been written about the level of institutionalization in new party systems. Yet the 
question of the causes of systemic institutionalization has remained, to say the least, 
controversial. In order to begin to solve this question, and making use of four 
different methodological techniques (MSDO/MDSO, congruence, PT and csQCA), 
this article has tried to answer the following three questions: what factors, why and 
how some post-communist party systems have managed to institutionalize while 
others have not? 
 From a methodological point of view, this article not only confirms the 
general benefits of using MMR, but more specifically, and clearly attuned with other 
articles of this special issue (Beach and Rohlfing; Schneider and Rohlfing; Beach) the 
complementarity of both “configurational” and case-study techniques. Indeed, and 
adequately combined, condition-/mechanism-centered MMR designs can provide 
scholars with more (even if different) information than the most sophisticated 
quantitative analysis. Thus, while the MSDO/MDSO procedure has reduced 
complexity by reducing the number of possible explanatory conditions from a total of 
seventeen to just four, the combination of both congruence and PT has allowed me to 
understand the specific causal mechanisms linking each of the conditions to the 
outcome both at specific moments and over time, respectively. Once it was clear – 
thanks to the use of PT - that all causal conditions were neither always present (or 
absent) nor directly linked, a fully confirmatory csQCA, using Schneider and 
Rohlfing’s (in this special issue) terminology, enabled me to know the manner in 
which they combined for specific post-communist countries. 
From a substantive perspective, the main conclusion is the following: at least 
until 2010, party systems in economically developed nations institutionalized to a 
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higher degree than in economically backward countries. This is not to say, however, 
that poor countries could not institutionalize, as the examples of both Romania and 
Ukraine clearly show. However, this certainly required further efforts, that is, (1) a 
low number of legislative parties, and (2) a system of public funding or a cumulative 
cleavage structure. 
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the article seems to imply, similarly 
to what can be found in the democratic consolidation literature (Przeworski and 
Limongi, 1997), the existence of a certain threshold of wealth, suggesting that during 
the first two decades the institutionalization in post-communist party systems was, if 
not only, mostly a question of money. 
Although it is perhaps too early to form any definitive conclusions, as the most 
recent electoral results in Hungary, Slovenia or the Czech Republic show, pointing as 
they do to a certain process of de-institutionalization (Haughton and Kraovec, 2013; 
Stegmaier and Linek, 2014; Deegan-Krause and Haughton, forthcoming), what my 
findings do definitively show is the necessity to build a bridge between those scholars 
who exclusively emphasize either sociological or institutional dependence. Indeed, 
and in a similar vein to what all the contributions in this special issue suggest in terms 
of methodology, complementarity of different explanatory approaches constitutes the 
only way forward for any revision of the judgements made here. 
 
References 
Bartolini, S. and Mair, P. (1990): Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: 
the Stabilization of European Electorates 1885–1985, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R.B. (2013): Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations and 
Guidelines. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press 
Benoit, K. and Laver, M. (2006): Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: 
Routledge 
Berg-Schlosser, D. and De Meur, G. (2009): “Comparative Research Design: Case 
and Variable Selection”, in Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.) 
Configurational Comparative Methods. London: Sage 
Bielasiak, J. (2002): “The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in 
Postcommunist States”, Comparative Politics, v. 34, n. 2, pp. 189-210 
 27 
Birnir, J.K. (2005): “Public Venture Capital and Party Institutionalization”, 
Comparative Political Studies, v. 38, n. 8, pp. 915-938 
Brewer, J. and Hunter, A. (2006): Foundations of Multimethod Research: 
Synthesizing Styles. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Caporaso, J. (2009): “Is there a Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Comparative 
Politics? The Case of Process Tracing”, in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.) 
Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Casal Bértoa, F. (2012): “Parties, Regimes and Cleavages: Explaining Party System 
Institutionalization in East Central Europe”, East European Politics, v. 28, n. 4, pp. 
452-472 
Casal Bértoa, F. (2013): “Post-communist Politics: on the Convergence or Divergence 
of East and West”, Government and Opposition, v. 48, n. 3, pp. 398-433 
Casal Bértoa, F. (2014): “Party Systems and Cleavage Structures Revisited: A 
Sociological Explanation to Party System Institutionalization in East Central Europe”, 
Party Politics, v. 20, n. 1, pp. 16-36 
Casal Bértoa, F. (2015): “Party System Institutionalization. A Travelling Concept?”, 
in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Fernando Casal Bértoa (eds.), Party Politics and 
Democracy in Europe: Essays in Honour of Peter Mair. Abingdon/New York: 
Routledge 
Casal Bértoa, F. and Enyedi, Z. (2014): “Party System Closure and Openness: 
Conceptualization, Operationalization and Validation”, Party Politics, Online First 
Casal Bértoa, F. and Mair, P. (2012): “Party System Institutionalization across Time 
in Post-Communist Europe”, in Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Hans Keman (eds.) 
Party Government in the New Europe. London: Routledge 
Casal Bértoa, F. and Spirova, M. (2013): “Get a Subsidy or Perish! Party Funding and 
Party Survival in Europe”, The Legal Regulation of Political Parties Working Paper 
Series (n. 29) 
Cooper, B. and Glaesser, J. (2012): “Qualitative Work and the Testing and 
Development of Theory: Lessons from a Study Combining Cross-Case and Within-
Case Analysis via Ragin’s QCA”, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, v. 13, n. 2, art.4 
Deegan-Krause, K. and Haughton, T. (forthcoming): “Hurricane Season: Systems of 
Instability in Central and East European Party Politics”, East European Politics and 
Societies 
 28 
De Meur, C. and Berg-Schlosser, D. (1994): “Comparing Political Systems – 
Establishing Similarities and Dissimilarities”, European Journal of Political 
Research, v. 26, n. 2, pp. 193-219 
De Meur, C. and Berg-Schlosser, D. (1996): “Conditions of Authoritarianism, 
Fascism and Democracy in Inter-War Europe: Systematic Matching and Contrasting 
of Cases for ‘Small N’ Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, v. 29, n. 4, pp. 423-
468 
De Meur, C., Bursens, P. and Gottcheiner, A. (2006): “MSDO/MDSO Revisited for 
Public Policy Analysis”, in B. Rihoux and H. Grimm (eds.) Innovative Comparative 
Methods for Policy Analysis. New York: Springer 
De Meur, C. and Gottcheiner, A. (2009): “The Logic and Assumptions of MSDO-
MDSO Designs”, in David Byrne and Charles C. Ragin (eds.) The SAGE Handbook 
of Case-Based Methods. London: Sage 
Enyedi, Z. (2006): “The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in 
Hungary”, in Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU Member 
States, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Enyedi, Z. (2007): “Party Funding in Hungary”, in Daniel Smilov and Jurij Toplak 
(eds.), Political Finance and Corruption in Eastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Enyedi, Z. and Casal Bértoa (2011): “Patterns of Inter-Party Competition (1990-
2009)”, in Paul G. Lewis and Radosław Markowski (eds.) Europeanizing Party 
Politics? Comparative Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 
Enyedi, Z. and Tóka, G. (2007): “The Only Game in Town: Party Politics in 
Hungary”, in Paul Webb and Stephen White (eds.) Party Politics in New 
Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
George, A.L. and Bennett, A. (2005): Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
Grofman, B. and Schneider, C.Q. (2009): “An Introduction to Crisp Set QCA, with a 
Comparison to Binary Logistic Regression”, Political Research Quarterly, v. 20, n. 
10, pp. 1-11 
Haughton, T. and Krasovec, A. (2013): “The 2011 Parliamentary Elections in 
Slovenia”, Electoral Studies, v. 32, n. 1, pp. 201-204 
Huntington, S.P. (1968): Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press 
 29 
Johnson, E. P. (2002): “Streams of Least Resistance: The Institutionalization of 
Political Parties and Democracy in Indonesia”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Virginia 
Katz, R.S. and P. Mair (1995): “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy: the Emergence of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, v. 1, n.1, pp. 5-28 
Kitschelt, H., (1995): “Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-communist 
Democracies”, Parties Politics, v. 1, n. 4, pp. 447-472 
Ladrech, R. (2011): “(Shallow) Europeanization and party system instability in post-
communist states: how changing constraints undermine the development of stable 
partisan linkages”, in Paul G. Lewis and Radosław Markowski (eds.) Europeanizing 
Party Politics? Comparative Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press 
Lindberg, S.I. (2007): “Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity 
among Legislative Parties in Africa´s Democracies”, Government and Opposition, v. 
42, n. 2, pp. 215-241 
Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. (1967): “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments: an Introduction”, in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) Party 
Systems and Voter Alignments, New York: Free Press 
Madrid, R. (2005): “Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latin America”, 
Comparative Politics, v. 38, n. 1, pp. 1-20 
Mainwaring, S. (1999): Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of 
Democratization: The Case of Brazil, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 
Mainwaring, S., and Scully, T. (1995): Building Democratic Institutions: Party 
Systems in Latin America, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 
Mainwaring, S., and Zoco, E. (2007): “Political Sequences and the Stabilization of 
Inter-party Competition”, Party Politics, v. 13, n. 2, pp. 155-178 
Meleshevich, A. (2007): Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: a Comparative 
Study of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine, New 
York: Palgrave 
Morlino, L. (1998): Democracy between Consolidation and Crisis: Parties, Groups, 
and Citizens in Southern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Pedersen, M.N. (1979): “The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing 
Patterns of Electoral Volatility”, European Journal of Political Research, v. 7, pp. 1-
26 
 30 
Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. (1997): “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, World 
Politics, v. 49, n. 2, pp. 155-183 
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. (1970): The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New 
York: John Wiley 
Ragin, C.C. (1987): The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Los Angeles: University of California Press 
Ragin, C.C. (2008): Redesigning social inquiry: fuzzy sets and beyond. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press 
Ramonaitė, A. (2006): “The Development of the Lithuanian Party System: From 
Stability to Perturbation”, in Susanne Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-Communist EU 
Member States, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Remmer, K.L. (1985): “Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule in 
Latin America”, Comparative Politics, v. 17, n. 3, pp. 253-275 
Rihoux, B. (2006):  “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related 
Systematic Comparative Methods: Recent Advances and Remaining Challenges for 
Social Science Research”, International Sociology, v. 21, pp. 679 
Rihoux, B. and Ragin, C.C. (eds.) (2009): Configurational Comparative Methods. 
London: Sage 
Roberts, K.M. and Wibbels, E. (1999): “Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in 
Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations”, 
American Political Science Review, v. 93, n. 3, pp. 575–590 
Sartori, G. (1976): Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Volume I, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Scarrow, S.E. (2006): “Party Subsidies and the Freezing of Party Competition: Do 
Cartel Mechanisms Work?”, West European Politics, v. 29, n. 4, pp. 619-639 
Schneider, C.Q. and Rohlfing, I. (2013): “Combining QCA and Process Tracing in 
Set-Theoretic Multi-Method Research”, Sociological Methods and Research, Online 
First   
Schneider, C.Q. and Wagemann, C. (2010): “Standards of Good Practice in 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets”, Comparative Sociology, 
v. 9, n. 3, pp. 397-418 
 31 
Schneider, C.Q. and Wagemann, C. (2012): Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social 
Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Spirova, M. (2007): Political Parties in Post-communist Societies: Formation, 
Persistence and Change, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Stegmaier, M. and Linek, L. (2014): “The Parliamentary Election in the Czech 
Republic, October 2013”, Electoral Studies, v. 35, pp. 385-388 
Tarrow, S. (2010): “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of 
Practice”, Comparative Political Studies, v. 43, n. 2, pp. 230-259 
Tavits, M. (2005): “The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in 
Post-Communist Europe”, American Journal of Political Science, v. 49, n. 2, pp. 283- 
298 
Toole, J. (2000): “Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East 
Central Europe”, Party Politics, v. 6, n. 4, pp. 441-461 
Tóka, G. (2004): “Hungary”, in Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank H. 
Aarebrot (ed.) The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar 
Tucker, J.A. (2006): Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Vachudová, M. (2008): “Tempered by the EU? Political Parties and Party Systems 
Before and After Accession”, Journal of European Public Policy, v. 15, n. 6, pp. 871-
879 
 
